Lab 18 · Policy-as-Code: Kyverno Admission Policies¶
Core Lesson: Labs 05–06 enforced rules at the network layer; lab 17 granted API access. Kyverno enforces rules about what objects may exist at all — a validating/mutating admission controller whose policies are YAML, not Rego. Required labels, no
:latest, only signed images, resource limits mandatory: the tribal-knowledge checklist becomes executable policy. GCP Twin: GKE Policy Controller (Gatekeeper/OPA) is the managed equivalent — same idea, different DSL (Rego vs Kyverno's YAML).
1. Architecture Decision: Audit → Enforce¶
| Mode | Behavior | Use |
|---|---|---|
audit |
violations logged in PolicyReport, object admitted |
always start here — see the blast radius before enforcing |
enforce |
violating objects rejected at admission | flip after the report is clean |
flowchart LR
U[kubectl apply / Flux] --> A{Admission chain}
A -->|mutating?| M[mutate: inject defaults]
A -->|validating| V{Kyverno policies}
V -->|pass| ETCD[(etcd)]
V -->|fail + enforce| X[rejected with message]
V -->|fail + audit| R[PolicyReport entry]
2. Step-by-Step Hands-On Build¶
Step 1: Install¶
helm install kyverno kyverno/kyverno -n kyverno --create-namespace
kubectl -n kyverno get pods # admission + background + cleanup controllers
Step 2: Three teaching policies — the checklist made executable¶
cat << 'EOF' > policies.yaml
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata: {name: require-labels}
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit # START IN AUDIT — always
rules:
- name: require-app-label
match:
any: [{resources: {kinds: [Deployment, StatefulSet]}}]
validate:
message: "app.kubernetes.io/name label required"
pattern:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: "?*"
---
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata: {name: disallow-latest-tag}
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: no-latest
match:
any: [{resources: {kinds: [Pod]}}]
validate:
message: "image tag 'latest' is forbidden — pin a version"
pattern:
spec:
=(ephemeralContainers): "X"
containers:
- image: "!*:latest"
---
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata: {name: require-resource-limits}
spec:
validationFailureAction: audit
rules:
- name: require-limits
match:
any: [{resources: {kinds: [Pod]}}]
validate:
message: "cpu/memory limits required"
pattern:
spec:
containers:
- resources:
limits:
memory: "?*"
cpu: "?*"
EOF
kubectl apply -f policies.yaml
Step 3: Generate violations, read the report¶
kubectl run bad-pod --image=nginx:latest # violates 2 of 3 policies
kubectl get policyreport -A # audit findings land here
kubectl describe clusterpolicyreport | grep -A3 "Result: fail"
Step 4: Flip to enforce — now the admission rejects¶
kubectl patch clusterpolicy disallow-latest-tag --type=json \
-p '[{"op":"replace","path":"/spec/validationFailureAction","value":"enforce"}]'
kubectl run bad-pod2 --image=nginx:latest
# Error: admission webhook denied the request: image tag 'latest' is forbidden
Step 5: Signed images only (closes the Phase-2 cosign loop)¶
Kyverno's verifyImages rule checks cosign signatures at admission — the
deploy-time enforcement of what you signed in CI:
# rule sketch — verify signature identity before admitting:
# verifyImages:
# - image: "*"
# keyless:
# subject: "https://gitlab.com/<group>/<repo>//.gitlab-ci.yml"
# issuer: "https://gitlab.com"
3. Deliberate Break & Triage¶
| Break | Symptom | Lesson |
|---|---|---|
Enforce require-labels before fixing existing deployments |
new ReplicaSets rejected on rollout | audit-first isn't politeness — enforce blocks transitions, not just new objects |
Policy matches Pod but Flux applies Deployment |
reports on pods only — deployment admitted | match at the controller level you actually apply |
failurePolicy: Fail webhook + kyverno down |
all admissions blocked → cluster wedged | webhooks are in the control path; audit/failurePolicy decisions are availability decisions |
Pattern !*:latest on a digest ref |
digest refs (@sha256:) bypass tag rules |
tag policies need digest-awareness; signed-image rules close the hole |
4. Verify¶
- A
PolicyReportread and explained (who violated, which rule, when) - audit→enforce rollout plan stated cold
- Kyverno vs Gatekeeper in one line (YAML/CEL-style vs Rego DSL)
- You can name a mutating vs validating admission difference (Istio's sidecar injector is mutating; policies above validate)
5. Continue¶
gitlab-spring-app-fluxsecurity stage + this lab = sign-in-CI → verify-at-admission, the complete supply-chain loop