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Lab 17 · Access & Admission: RBAC, TLS Certificates, and Operators

Core Lesson: Three "last mile" production controls in one lab: RBAC answers who may call the API (labs used cluster-admin — unacceptable in prod); cert-manager answers where TLS certs come from (lab 08's ingress terminated TLS by hand); operators/CRDs answer how Kubernetes itself gets extended — Flux, ESO, cert-manager and Flagger are all operators you've already used without naming the pattern. GCP Twin: RBAC↔IAM binding is the same least-privilege story as iam.tf; cert-manager ↔ GKE managed certs.


1. RBAC: from cluster-admin to least privilege

The objects in one breath: Role/ClusterRole = permission sets (verb + resource); RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding = permission grants (set + subject + scope).

# A read-only developer role, namespace-scoped:
cat << 'EOF' | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata: {name: app-reader, namespace: dom-apps}
rules:
  - apiGroups: ["", "apps"]
    resources: [pods, pods/log, deployments, services]
    verbs: [get, list, watch]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata: {name: dev-read-dom-apps, namespace: dom-apps}
subjects:
  - kind: ServiceAccount
    name: dev-user
    namespace: dom-apps
roleRef:
  kind: Role
  name: app-reader
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
EOF

# prove it — impersonation is the debugging superpower:
kubectl auth can-i list pods -n dom-apps --as=system:serviceaccount:dom-apps:dev-user
# yes
kubectl auth can-i delete pods -n dom-apps --as=system:serviceaccount:dom-apps:dev-user
# no   ← least privilege verified, not assumed
RBAC instinct to build Why
Role + RoleBinding (namespaced) default; ClusterRole* only for cluster objects (nodes, CRDs, namespaces) cluster-scoped grants are blast-radius multipliers
kubectl auth can-i --as= before granting verify the grant, don't assume it
Secrets access = separate decision get secrets in a namespace ≈ read-all-credentials

2. cert-manager: TLS as a reconciled object

Replace the hand-rolled cert from lab 08 with the issuer→certificate flow:

helm install cert-manager jetstack/cert-manager -n cert-manager \
  --create-namespace --set crds.enabled=true
# ClusterIssuer = the CA plumbing (selfSigned for lab; ACME/Let's Encrypt or
# a private CA in real estates)
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: ClusterIssuer
metadata: {name: lab-ca}
spec:
  selfSigned: {}
---
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Certificate                  # the request — cert-manager does the rest
metadata: {name: ingress-tls, namespace: dom-apps}
spec:
  secretName: ingress-tls-secret   # ← lands here as a real tls Secret
  dnsNames: [app.acme.local]
  issuerRef: {name: lab-ca, kind: ClusterIssuer}

kubectl get certificate shows READY: True → the ingress-tls-secret exists → wire it into the lab-08 Ingress tls: block. Renewal is automatic before expiry — that's the point: certs become a reconciled object, not a calendar reminder.

3. Operators & CRDs: the pattern under everything

kubectl get crd | grep -E "cert-manager|external-secrets|flagger|fluxcd"

You've used operators all along: a CRD declares a new API object (Certificate, ExternalSecret, Canary); an operator is the controller loop reconciling it toward desired state. Kubernetes is programmable — the pattern you're now qualified to build with kubebuilder/operator-sdk when a CRD you need doesn't exist.

Admission controllers are the other hook: mutating (Istio's sidecar injector — lab 06!) vs validating (lab 18's policy engine). You finally have the full control-loop mental model.

4. Deliberate Break & Triage

Break Symptom Lesson
RoleBinding in wrong namespace can-i returns no despite correct Role name bindings are scoped to their own namespace
Certificate READY: False describe certificate shows issuer mismatch or bad dnsName cert issues surface as events on the Certificate, not pod logs
kubectl delete crd certificates.cert-manager.io every Certificate + managed secret orphaned/deleted CRD deletion cascades — it's why infra CRDs are tier-0 in lab 09
Grant get secrets to dev-user SA can now read every secret in namespace secrets RBAC is a separate trust boundary from pods RBAC

5. Verify

  • auth can-i --as= used to prove least privilege
  • A Certificate reconciled into a usable ingress TLS secret
  • You can name: CRD declares, operator reconciles, admission intercepts
  • The three objects chain cold: Role (permissions) → RoleBinding (grant) → subject

6. Continue

  • Lab 18 — validating admission at scale: Kyverno policies enforcing the rules this lab granted